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Major Privacy Concerns When Minor Sues for 
Paternity 
Lauren Taub∗ 
Minors commonly bring paternity suits to establish parental 
support obligations when a father is absent from the child’s 
upbringing. Individuals who do not know their biological parents, 
like adopted minors or adults, also seek parentage determinations. It 
is quite unusual, however, for a minor raised since birth by both his 
biological mother and his mother’s husband to bring a paternity 
action.  
In Sutton ex rel. Minor J. v. Diane J.,1 a Michigan teenager sued 
his biological mother to compel her to disclose the identity of his 
biological father. Although the teen ultimately did not prevail, if he 
had, his mother would have been forced, against her wishes, to reveal 
the identity of his biological father.2 Cases such as this one balance a 
parent’s interest in privacy against a child’s interest in knowing the 
identity of his or her biological father.  
Part I of this Note summarizes the facts of Sutton. Part II explores 
the constitutional development of family privacy, while Part III 
outlines a minor’s contrasting interest in knowing the identity of his 
or her biological parents, detailing various legal and psychological 
factors that courts may consider. Part IV overviews relevant statutory 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2008, Washington University School of Law. B.S. Communication, University of 
Miami. I wish to express my deepest thanks to Leigh and Mitch Taub and the hard-working 
staff of the Journal of Law & Policy. I send my most sincere gratitude to Susan Appleton for 
inspiring my interest in Family Law and in this Note.  
 1. No. 273519, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 754 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2007); cert. 
denied, 737 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 2007).  
 2. Steve Pardo, Teen to Continue Fight to Find Father: Appeals Court Says Mom 
Doesn’t Have to Reveal who his Biological Dad Is; Boy Wants to Know Health History, 
DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 24, 2007, at 4A. On September 12, 2007, the Michigan Supreme Court 
considered and denied the teen’s motion to appeal a summary disposition of the case in favor of 
the defendant, his mother. Sutton, 737 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 2007). 
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authority permitting minors to discover the identity of their birth 
parents in limited circumstances.  
Part V of this Note offers several reasons why the Michigan courts 
rightly decided Sutton and why other similarly situated courts should 
favor parental privacy over a child’s desire to know his or her 
biological parent(s) based on the laws as they are written. Finally, 
Part VI offers an approach for courts to use in analyzing issues like 
the dilemma in Sutton, and calls for legislative reform to address the 
issue, as it will inevitably arise again in similar disputes.  
I. SUTTON: HOW THE SUIT CAME ABOUT 
On April 21, 2006, Minor J. (Minor) with the help of his legal 
father, Michael J. (Michael), filed a petition in Macomb County, 
Michigan to determine the identity of Minor’s biological father.3 In 
the suit, Minor sought to compel his mother, Diane J. (Diane), to 
reveal the identity of his biological father because of Minor’s health 
concern in knowing his genetic medical history.4 Michael is Minor’s 
legal father because Michael and Diane were married at the time of 
Minor’s birth.5 They divorced in 1995 after thirteen years of 
marriage.6 Custody of Minor was split between Michael and Diane, 
but as of July 2006, Minor was living full-time with Michael.7  
Michael is the only father that Minor has known,8 but in early 
2004, Michael began to question whether he was Minor’s biological 
father.9 The teen did not look like Michael and suspiciously suffered 
from asthma.10 In April 2004, the family had DNA tests 
 
 3. See Steve Pardo, Teen Pleads for Dad’s Identity: Macomb Judge Will Decide Whether 
Mother Must Reveal who ‘Minor J’s’ Biological Father Is, DETROIT NEWS, July 25, 2006, at 
4B.  
 4. Sutton, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 754, at *1.  
 5. See Steve Pardo & Christina Stolarz, Teen Sues Mom in Bid to ID Dad: Metro Area 
17-Year-Old Finds Man who Raised Him Isn’t Biological Dad: They Unite to Seek Genetic 
History, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 28, 2006, at 1A.  
 6. See Pardo, supra note 3.  
 7. Id. 
 8. See Brian Dickerson, An Absent Dad’s Letter to a Son He Never Knew, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, July 26, 2006, at 1.  
 9. See Pardo, supra note 3.  
 10. Id.  
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administered11 to determine if Michael was Minor’s biological 
father.12 Two separate DNA tests revealed that Michael was not 
Minor’s biological father.13 Minor’s mother offered the name of 
another man who might have been Minor’s biological father, referred 
to as “Mr. X” in the lawsuit.14 A subsequent DNA test found that Mr. 
X was not Minor’s father.15 According to her lawyer, Diane was 
adamant that Michael is Minor’s biological as well as legal father16 
and was not confident in the validity of the DNA tests that dispelled 
the possibility that Michael was Minor’s biological father.17  
This case presents the balance courts must strike in determining 
paternity suits by assessing the interest of the parent’s right to privacy 
against the child’s interest in knowing his or her biological father. 
Generally, paternity cases threaten only to infringe on the privacy of 
an unaware biological father, but this case, unlike most cases, raises 
the question of the known mother’s privacy.18 Despite these privacy 
concerns, children like Minor may have a legal right to know their 
biological fathers19 because in some cases, the law will put aside 
parental and family privacy to protect the best interests of the child.20  
II. FAMILY AND PARENTAL PRIVACY IN THE CONSTITUTION 
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first introduced 
the right to privacy, seeking to protect individuals from outside 
interference with their personal lives.21 Later, in his dissent in 
 
 11. DNA testing helps courts “determine with near irrefutable surety who is and who is 
not a child’s biological father.” Melvin Claxton & Sheila Burke, Dads Pay Support For Other 
Men’s Kids: DNA Tests Expose Inconsistency in Tennessee Courts, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), 
July 22, 2007, at 1A.  
 12. See Pardo & Stolarz, supra note 5.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. See Pardo, supra note 3.  
 17. See John Masson, Teen Sues His Mom to Learn Dad’s Identity: Experts: Ruling Could 
Set Harmful Precedent, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 25, 2006, at 1.  
 18. See infra Part V.B–C. 
 19. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 20. See infra note 120.  
 21. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890) (finding a cause of action in tort for interference with privacy, by drawing on the 
common law principles of “protection in person and in property”).  
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Olmstead v. United States,22 Brandeis introduced the idea of a 
constitutional right to privacy.23 Since then, the presence of a 
constitutional right to privacy has been a point of debate.24  
Seventy-five years after Warren and Brandeis’ proposal, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional right to privacy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.25 Griswold began a line of cases 
recognizing the right to privacy26 in personal and family decision-
 
 Though Warren and Brandeis were the first to introduce privacy as a legal right, the interest 
in family privacy stems back to the English Enlightenment with Locke and Montesquieu. Larry 
Peterman & Tiffany Jones, Defending Family Privacy, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 80 (2003). 
Locke “demonstrates the needfulness of family privacy by arguing essentially that education 
and moral development cannot proceed, let alone succeed, without it.” Id. at 80. Using the same 
principles that support family privacy from the Enlightenment, the United States Supreme 
Court has ruled numerous times that parents have the right to make decisions about their 
children without state intervention. See cases cited infra note 27.  
 22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 23. Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes out of 
the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 373 (2006) (“Brandeis described the intent of the 
Constitution’s drafters to protect citizens in their thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and sensations, 
recognizing that the right to pursue happiness necessarily encompasses such protections. 
Brandeis famously concluded that ‘they conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and right most valued by civilized men’.”). 
 24. See Nicholas Ciappetta, Florida’s Scarlet Letter Repealed: A Retrospective Analysis 
of the Constitutionality of the Florida Adoption Notification Provision and a Commentary on 
the Future of the Right to Privacy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 675, 724 (2003) (concluding that 
“[d]espite decades of debate and endless scholarly articles, the privacy question remains the 
Rubic’s cube of constitutional law, except that no solution appears imminent”).  
 25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the criminalization of the use of contraception, even 
by married users, was an unconstitutional violation of the right to privacy). Justice Douglas’ 
majority opinion explains, 
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . . Various guarantees 
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First 
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against 
the quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent of the 
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination 
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force 
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration 
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.” 
Id. at 484 (citations omitted).  
 26. Privacy in this context refers to both confidentiality and autonomy. The Fourteenth 
Amendment has been interpreted to protect both kinds of privacy interests: “One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/17
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making.27 Almost thirty years later, Planned Parenthood v. Casey28 
solidified the privacy interests recognized in Griswold and its 
progeny. Casey confirmed that the Constitution protects “personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education.”29 The Court found that 
these things, “involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime [and] . . . are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment[,] . . . the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence.”30  
The Supreme Court has consistently established privacy rights, 
particularly within the family.31 “The right to privacy restricts the 
 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
599–600 (1977).  
 27. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to include a guarantee of 
confidentiality in family decision-making. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (holding the private decision to have children extends to both married and unmarried 
couples); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Court also found a right of 
autonomy in family decision-making, allowing adults to make decisions affecting marriage, 
procreation, and the upbringing of children without government intrusion. See, e.g., Moore v. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (finding, “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the 
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding the “right to privacy . . . is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”); 
Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (holding compulsory sterilization 
could not be a sentencing as punishment for a crime); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925) (striking down legislation that “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that the Constitution guarantees “the 
right of the individual to . . . engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”).  
 28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (invalidating a law that placed an “undue burden” on patients 
seeking an abortion, and establishing the “undue burden” test for abortion regulations). 
 29. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
 30. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). See also Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000).  
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will 
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family 
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the 
rearing of that parent’s children. 
Id.; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding a ban on interracial marriage violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).  
 31. See cases cited supra notes 27—30.  
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government’s ability to interfere with intimate personal relationships 
and activities, and the freedom to make fundamental decisions that 
involve one’s self, family, and relationships with others.”32  
III. DESPITE FAMILY AND PARENTAL PRIVACY, MINORS HAVE 
PRACTICAL INTERESTS IN KNOWING THEIR BIOLOGICAL PARENTS  
Even though the Constitution protects family and parental privacy, 
which presumably includes a parent’s right to remain anonymous,33 
minors who have not been raised by both of their biological parents 
have an interest in knowing the identity of their absent biological 
parent(s). In these situations, minors seek the identity of their 
biological parent(s) to obtain financial support,34 to ascertain medical 
information,35 to determine their biological identity,36 and to conform 
to perceived societal norms.37 
A. Support  
A minor may independently,38 or with his or her mother, seek to 
establish paternity in order to obtain support from the minor’s father. 
Courts have recognized that minors’ rights to support are 
fundamental,39 regardless of their parents’ marital status. In Gomez v. 
 
 32. Claudine R. Reiss, Comment, The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box: The Need to 
Restore Birth Parents’ Privacy Rights in the Adoption Process, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 133, 139 
(1998) (citing Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (Tex. 
1976)).  
 33. If parents did not have a right to remain anonymous it might have a chilling effect on 
those willing to give up their child for adoption.  
 34. See infra Part III.A. To establish paternal support obligations, a minor may bring suit 
in conjunction with his or her mother or with individual counsel. Adoptees will typically not 
seek financial support when trying to identify their biological parent because they have already 
received financial support from their adoptive family.  
 35. See infra Part III.B. 
 36. See infra Part III.C. 
 37. See infra Part III.D.  
 38. When minors bring paternity suits on their own behalf, they generally need the help of 
an attorney or a family member. Alternatively, the state may bring suit on behalf of a minor 
based on a request from a family member, community member, or social worker.  
 39. Carlotta P. Wells, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings: Barring an 
“Illegitimate’s” Right to Support, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 585 (1983). 
Although aware of the complex problems of proof involved in paternity actions, these 
courts, nevertheless, have held that such problems do not outweigh the child’s vital 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/17
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Perez,40 “the Supreme Court held that once a state granted legitimate 
children an enforceable right to parental support, it could not deny 
illegitimate children the same ‘essential’ right.”41  
B. Medical 
Besides establishing support obligations, a child may have a 
medical interest in finding his or her parents’ identity because many 
medical disorders are genetic and can be inherited from maternal or 
paternal lines.42 If potential defects are determined early in the child’s 
life, there is a possibility that the defects can be prevented or treated 
to minimize the effects of an inherited disease.43 
C. Biological Identity  
By suing to establish paternity, children may also seek biological 
identity as “[b]iology is extremely important to children.”44 Children 
 
interests in financial support. In reaching this conclusion, these courts have relied on 
both the public policy reasons underlying the enactment of paternity statutes and the 
advancements in scientific testing, which now permit an accurate and objective 
determination of whether a particular defendant fathered the illegitimate child. 
Id. at 585. 
 40. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).  
 41. Wells, supra note 39, at 581 (citing Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538).  
 42. Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interest Marital Presumption of 
Paternity: It is Actually in the Best Interest of Children to Divorce the Current Application of 
the Best Interest Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 345, 
374 (2006) (explaining the value of knowing genetic medical history from both maternal and 
paternal lines). 
 43. Id. at 376. McRae found that the child’s best interest is always served by rebutting the 
marital presumption of paternity because:  
(A) it will always be in the children’s best interests to know their accurate family 
medical history, (B) children who do not know the identity of their biological parents 
may suffer psychologically, and (C) paternity preclusion will either (1) irreversibly 
prohibit the children from learning the truth about their biological paternity when they 
mature and/or their circumstances change or (2) fail to efficiently and fairly provide 
the children with a resolution to their paternity disputes.  
Id. at 373. In addition, a child can alter his or her lifestyle to accommodate or prevent the onset 
of certain genetic diseases. Id. at 375 n.186 (explaining, “if diabetes runs in the [child’s] family, 
they can prevent or minimize the onset of diabetes by improving their diet and exercising”). 
Furthermore, a child who does not know their biological parent(s) may be concerned about 
future generations when they have their own offspring. 
 44. Id. at 378 (citing DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT TO 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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may suffer “genealogical bewilderment” because they cannot 
construct their biological identity.45 In addition, children may go 
through a grieving process due to the “loss” of a biological parent.46 
The grieving process may manifest itself by the child becoming 
argumentative, disruptive, and intensely angry, thereby causing a 
strain on the entire family.47  
D. Social Pressure  
Children may also face societal pressure to know both of their 
biological parents. Families, in the traditional sense, consist of two 
parents raising their biological child or children.48 Children may feel 
pressure from friends at school, from cultural norms on television, or 
from everyday activities to conform to this traditional family, and 
may seek the identity of both of their biological parents.49  
 
ADOPTION: DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL ISSUES 1 (1998)) (even adopted children feel a 
sense of loss without contact with their biological parents). 
 45. McRae, supra note 40, at 378–79. McRae distinguishes children who do not have 
access to their biological parents from children who have lost a parent. She explains that 
children who have lost a parent from death or divorce knew the identity of their parent and can 
more easily complete their grieving process, unlike children who never learn their parent’s 
identity. Id. The latter continue to fantasize about their living biological parent, unable to 
identify with them. Id. at 379–80. 
 46. McRae, supra note 42, at 378.  
 47. Id. 
 48. David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless 
Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 809 (1999).  
The [Supreme] Court’s concept of family accords perfectly with traditional, structural 
definitions used by government agencies and by sociologists, which “delineate as 
members (of a family) only those who have established biological or sociolegal 
legitimacy by virtue of shared genetics, marriage, or adoption.” Although the rigidity 
of this traditional definition is giving way somewhat of late, particularly as age-old 
consensus about the central place of marriage to both personal happiness and societal 
stability has begun to fray, it continues to predominate.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 49. Children that were adopted feel the same societal pressure. Id. at 810 (noting that 
“[t]he social and legal stigma attached to adoption may, in turn, distort dynamics within the 
family, contributing to what some psychologists and social workers have claimed is an 
increased incidence of maladjustment among adopted children”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/17
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IV. LEGAL RIGHTS TO MAKE PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS 
Despite judicial deference for family privacy in other settings, 
courts and legislatures are willing to intrude on the family to protect 
children’s best interests, namely, to ensure the “safety and well-being 
of children unable to care for themselves.”50 Where children are 
abused or neglected “deference to [decisions made by] the family 
must yield to the state’s interest in protecting” minors.51  
In addition, the state will intrude on family privacy in favor of 
child welfare to establish support obligations52 for single parent 
children, and where adopted minors or adopted adults seek the 
identity of their biological parents.53 In these cases, unlike cases with 
 
 50. Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interest of the Child: A 
False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 64 (1995).  
 51. Id.  
 52. Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act of 2001, a “support order” is 
defined as: 
[a] judgment, decree, order, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to 
modification, issued by a tribunal for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former 
spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or 
reimbursement, and may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, 
attorney’s fees, and other relief. 
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 102, 9IB U.L.A. 177 (2001).  
 53. See Janet Leach Richards, Medical Confidentiality and Disclosure of Paternity, 48 
S.D.L. REV. 409, 423–24 (2003) (describing and explaining the method and necessity of this 
framework for analysis). 
[T]he child’s best interest may involve not only the child’s immediate medical needs, 
but also a need to know his or her biological parentage in order to safeguard future 
health or psychological needs. At the same time, the child’s interests may not best be 
served if the family is disrupted by an untimely disclosure of paternity. An 
examination of a child’s right to know and the possibilities for disruption of the family 
can be analyzed by examining two different areas of law: (1) opening sealed adoption 
records and (2) conflicts between legal fathers and biological fathers.  
Id.  
 Though this paper focuses on minors’ efforts to establish parentage, states are also 
increasingly infringing on family privacy in paternity suits brought by legal fathers to 
disestablish child support obligations when DNA testing proves the legal fathers are not 
biologically related to their children. Calxon & Burke, supra note 11 (“DNA testing has 
dragged old infidelities and betrayal to the forefront, tearing apart families and forever altering 
the lives of children.”). Courts are increasingly and inconsistently using DNA evidence to 
terminate parental rights and child support when it is determined that a legal father is not a 
child’s biological father. Id.  
 There is a significant lag in paternity laws that fail to address DNA testing, so conflicts 
among courts are inevitable. Id. “We are going to have these conflicts because there is no 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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parental abuse or neglect, the parent(s) whose privacy is infringed 
have caused no direct harm to their child(ren). Rather, the harm to the 
child that courts and legislatures have sought to remedy is caused 
indirectly by the absence of the biological parent(s) from the child’s 
life.  
A. Suits for Support 
Generally, only minors without two legal parents may sue for a 
paternity determination to establish a father’s support obligation.54 A 
man is presumed to be the legal father of a child born to his wife 
during their marriage.55 (A child born under these circumstances is 
“legitimate.”) When an unmarried mother gives birth to a child (an 
“illegitimate” child), however, and a father is not identified, the 
mother may be interested in determining the child’s paternity to 
obtain child support from the father. Under these circumstances, an 
 
consensus on how important biology is to being declared a legal parent.” Id. (quoting Joanna 
Grossman of Hofstra University School of Law). Though paternity suits brought by fathers 
raise comparable questions of family privacy, this paper focuses on a minor’s ability to bring a 
paternity suit.  
 54. See Christina Stolarz, Teen Fighting to Find Real Dad: Lawyer For Fraser Boy who 
Sued Mom to Reveal Biological Father Takes Case to Appeals Court, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 20, 
2006, at 1B (noting that “Minor J. is considered a ‘legitimate’ child, [so] he has no standing to 
bring an action for entry of an order of filiation to name another man his father” because under 
Michigan law, “the husband at the time of conception and birth is deemed to be the legal father” 
of the child born to the married couple) (internal quotations omitted).  
 55. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204, 9B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 2005) (“A man is presumed to be 
the father of a child if . . . he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child 
is born during the marriage . . . .”). Furthermore, the Act places strict limitations on paternity 
suits when the child already has a legal father. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607, 9B U.L.A. 16 
(Supp. 2005). 
Except as otherwise provided . . . a proceeding brought by a presumed father, the 
mother, or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed 
father must be commenced not later than two years after the birth of the child . . . . A 
proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between a child and the 
child’s presumed father may be maintained at any time if the court determines that: (1) 
the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in 
sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; and (2) the 
presumed father never openly held out the child as his own.  
Id.  
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illegitimate child has a limited ability to determine the identity of his 
or her biological father through court-ordered DNA testing.56  
1. Legislative Purpose 
Congress has enacted legislation allowing children to establish 
paternity to collect financial support from “deadbeat” dads or moms 
who neglect their parental responsibilities.57 The purpose behind 
parental support statutes is three-fold. First, Congress wanted to 
decrease the financial strain on welfare payouts to single parents.58 If 
neglectful parents were forced to pay child support, the government 
would no longer absorb the cost of raising children supported by the 
often inadequate income of a single parent.59 Second, imposing 
support obligations on neglectful parents imposes some personal 
responsibility on “deadbeat” parents who disregard their obligations 
to their children.60 In addition, Congress hoped that forcing a parent 
to pay child support would force neglectful parents to work and in 
some cases, get “off the streets.”61 Third, Congress had sympathy for 
children who were supported by only one parent.62 By imposing an 
obligation on neglectful parents, Congress was hopeful that the 
 
 56. See cases and statutes cited infra notes 71–72.  
 57. See Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000) (punishing as 
a felony the willful failure to pay support for a child living in another state, with a presumption 
of nonpayment arising when the support has remained unpaid for two years or exceeds 
$10,000); Darrell Baughn, Throw the Book at Deadbeat Parents: Criminal Enforcement of 
Child Support Cases, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2000, at 49, 50–51 (examining the Deadbeat Parents 
Punishment Act (“DPPA”)). 
The DP[P]A created a presumption of willful nonpayment that shifts the burden of 
proof to the nonpaying parent. Ability to pay does not mean ability to earn income. 
The money could come from worker’s compensation, Social Security benefits, or any 
other source . . . . Recent federal cases have made it clear that if the nonpaying parent 
admits that a portion of the child support could have been paid, he or she is precluded 
from arguing inability to pay.  
Id.  
 58. See Kerri Harper, Note, Stereotypes, Childcare, and Social Change: How the Failure 
to Provide Childcare Perpetuates the Public Perception of Welfare Mothers, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 387, 400–04 (2001).  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  
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parents would become more involved in their children’s lives, and 
that it would give children the opportunity to know and interact with 
both of their parents. The statutory imposition of obligations reflects 
the value judgment that our society favors families with two parents 
supporting children, where both parents take some part in raising and 
supporting their children.63 
2. Michigan Law64  
Minors may bring paternity suits to establish paternal support 
obligations. In Michigan, the right of children to maintain paternity 
suits was upheld in Spada v. Pauley.65 Before Spada, under Michigan 
law, only mothers, fathers, or the Department of Social Services 
could bring a paternity action.66 The Spada court reasoned that the 
previous scheme “unreasonably restrict[ed] an illegitimate child’s 
right to obtain paternal support. Therefore, an illegitimate child may 
maintain an independent cause of action to determine parentage and 
support obligations.”67 In addition, the court found its holding was 
“in accord with the recent judicial and legislative trend to provide 
illegitimate children with equal protection of the law.”68  
Michigan law details procedures for paternity suits and paternity 
testing, while establishing limits to paternity proceedings.69 Under 
 
 63. See Meyer, supra note 48.  
 64. Though similar laws exist nationwide, Michigan law is used in this Note to address 
issues in Sutton. 
 65. 385 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). An illegitimate child can maintain an 
action to determine parentage because state has compelling interest to insure support for the 
child. Id. This right only applies to “illegitimate” children. Id. Cf. Puffpaff v. Hull, 426 N.W.2d 
778, 779–80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (a legitimate minor may not bring an action to determine 
parentage and parental support obligation).  
 66. See Spada, 385 N.W.2d at 748.  
 67. Id. See also supra note 38. 
 68. Id. The trend the court is referring to began with Gomez v. Perez, where the United 
States Supreme Court held “that a state cannot grant marital children a statutory right to 
paternal support while denying the right to non-marital children.” D. KELLY WEISBERG & 
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 450 (2006) (citing Gomez v. Perez, 409 
U.S. 535 (1973)). 
 69. Though Michigan law is used here, a federal standard governs paternity laws in each 
state. Congress set standards for states to follow when enacting laws regulating court-ordered 
DNA testing.  
 The first of the federal standards passed was the Child Support Enforcement Amendments 
of 1984 that required states (in exchange for federal funds) to extend their statutes of limitations 
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Michigan law, a child born to a married mother (a legitimate child) 
has no standing to establish his or her paternity.70 Furthermore, blood 
test evidence to determine parentage may only be used in limited 
circumstances.71 A court will only order genetic testing when parties 
 
to allow for paternity suits up to eighteen years after the child’s birth. See Family Support Act 
of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602 (West Supp. 2002). The Family Support Act of 1988, in addition to allowing suits 
previously barred under shorter statutes of limitation, requires states to have procedures through 
which all parties in a contested case must submit to genetic testing. See 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). 
There is an exception for individuals who can establish “good cause” for refusing to participate 
in the testing. Id. Under new welfare reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), states must establish tests to determine 
paternity for the states to receive federal funds for child support enforcement and welfare 
programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).  
The congressional findings associated with the enactment of the PRWORA 
highlighted the following factors: 1) “marriage is the foundation of a successful 
society;” 2) children born out-of-wedlock often burden the social welfare system; 3) 
young women who bear children out-of-wedlock are more likely than other women to 
require public assistance and, once enrolled, to depend on it for more years; and 4) 
children of welfare recipients face significant negative consequences in society. 
Accordingly, two of the stated purposes of the PRWORA are to “end the dependence 
of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and 
marriage,” and to “prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies 
and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of 
these pregnancies.” Ending the “cycle of dependency” through a mandatory work 
requirement and decreasing the number of out-of-wedlock children born to women 
while on welfare will help to alter society’s perception of welfare mothers and effect 
social change. 
Harper, supra note 58, at 400 (quoting various provisions of the PRWORA). 
 Under the PRWORA, either parent can obtain a genetic test, unless it is in the child’s best 
interests to preserve the child’s ties to his or her presumed father, the father who openly held 
himself out as the child’s father. See 42 U.S.C § 666 (2000). 
 70. Altman v. Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).  
In order to have standing to seek relief under the Paternity Act, plaintiff must allege 
that the child was born out of wedlock. M.C.L. 722.714(6); M.S.A. 25.494(6). “Child 
born out of wedlock” is defined as “a child begotten and born to a woman who was not 
married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child which the court 
has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of 
that marriage.” M.C.L. § 722.711(a); M.S.A. § 25.491(a). 
Id. See also Puffpaff, 426 N.W.2d at 779–80.  
 71. Prior to revisions in Michigan’s Paternity Act, there was a six year statute of 
limitations.  
Proceedings in pursuance of this act may be instituted during the pregnancy of the 
mother or after the birth of the child, but shall not be brought after the lapse of more 
than [six] years from the birth of the child, unless paternity has been acknowledged by 
the father in writing in accordance with statutory provisions. If any payment is made 
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cannot reach an agreement as to who the child’s father is and the 
child’s father has not acknowledged paternity under the statute.72  
The purpose of the Michigan statute to establish paternity is to 
determine support obligations of the biological father.73 If a child is 
already financially “supported” by his or her legal father, there is not 
as great a need to establish biological paternity under the statute.  
B. Adoptees’ Access to Birth Records 
In addition to children raised by only one biological parent, 
children who were adopted may also seek the identity of their 
biological parent or parents.74 There is a notable difference between 
an adoptee seeking birth record disclosure and a minor seeking a 
paternity determination—the adoptee is not seeking support from his 
or her biological parent because the adoptee has already received 
support from his or her adoptive family. These disclosure laws were 
 
for support of the child in the [six]-year period, the proceedings may be commenced 
any time within [six] years from the last of any such payment. If the defendant is 
outside the state during the [six]-year period, the time he is so absent shall not be 
included in the [six]-year period. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.714 (1983) (amended 1998). See also Shifter v. Wolf, 327 N.W.2d 
429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (blood test results can only be used to exclude paternity under the 
Michigan Paternity Act); In re Paternity of Flynn, 344 N.W.2d 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) 
(disapproved by Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1991)) (criticized in Soumis v. 
Soumis, 553 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 Currently the Michigan Paternity Act provides, “an action under this act may be 
commenced during the pregnancy of the child’s mother or at any time before the child reaches 
[eighteen] years of age.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.714 (1998). However, there are still limits 
to the ability of a party to be granted court-ordered DNA testing.  
 72. “An action to determine paternity shall not be brought under this [A]ct if the child’s 
father acknowledges paternity under the acknowledgement of [P]arentage [A]ct, or if the child’s 
paternity is established under the law of another state.” Id. 
[If] the parties fail to consent to an order naming the man as the child’s father as 
provided in this act within the time permitted for a responsive pleading, then the 
family independence agency or its designee may file and serve both the mother and the 
alleged father with a notice requiring that the other, alleged father, and child appear for 
genetic paternity testing. 
Id.  
 73. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 1985) (finding the Michigan 
Paternity Act is a procedural vehicle to establish paternity and support obligations for children 
born out of wedlock); Tuer v. Niedoliwka, 285 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (noting the 
primary purpose of Michigan Paternity Act is to provide support for illegitimate children). 
 74. See statutes cited infra notes 77–80.  
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designed with sympathy for children seeking information about their 
biological identity and genetic medical history.75 Unlike children 
seeking support, most adult adoptees never knew either of their 
biological parents. Unless their birth records are disclosed to them, 
they have neither the ability to establish any biological identity, nor 
any way of knowing their susceptibility to genetic disorders.  
There is wide variance in state laws regulating access to birth 
records.76 Some states allow open access to birth records for all 
adoptees upon reaching a certain age.77 Other states use voluntary 
registries78 and intermediary contacts79 to give interested adoptees 
access to their birth records. Michigan allows adults who were 
adopted as children to obtain their birth records.80 In these situations, 
 
 75. See Caroline B. Fleming, The Open-Records Debate: Balancing the Interests of Birth 
Parents and Adult Adoptees, 11 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 461, 461 n.3 (2005).  
 76. See statutes cited infra notes 77–80. 
 77. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 68, at 1092 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 
(2004); KAN. STAT. ANN § 65-2423 (2002)). “Alaska and Kansas have long allowed adult 
adoptees to view their birth records.” WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 68, at 1092. 
Alabama, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Tennessee also allow “unfettered” access to sealed 
birth records. Fleming, supra note 75, at 461 n.3 (citing state statutes giving full access to birth 
records: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12 (Michie Supp. 2004)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. 
§ 18.50.500 (LexisNexis 2004)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2122 (2002)), New Hampshire 
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:16 (2005)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.240 (West 
2003)), and Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (LexisNexis 2001)).  
 Advocates of open access to birth records contend that “adult adoptees have the right to 
learn about their backgrounds . . . for psychological [reasons,] . . . medical reasons[,] . . . [and] 
because all other adults are able to access the same type of information without restriction.” 
Fleming, 11 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. at 470–71.  
 78. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 68, at 1092 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-503 
(2002) that requires both parties to register before divulging birth records). 
 79. Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-25-8 (West 1999), the Indiana statute allowing an 
intermediary to contact one party to obtain consent to release information, once the other party 
registers).  
 80. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.68 (1995). In Michigan, information identifying birth 
parents may be accessed by an adult adopted person, birth parents, and adult birth siblings. Id. 
Non-identifying information may be provided to adult adoptees, birth parents, adult birth 
siblings, and the adoptive parents. Id. Under § 710.68, adult adoptees’ birth records can be 
released “unless either biological parent has filed, with the state, a written request that the 
information not be released. . . . A policy decision has been made in favor of disclosure. [The 
statute requires the] biological parent to prevent disclosure rather than the adoptee to prove its 
necessity.” In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). See also Wendy L. 
Weiss, Ohio House Bill 419: Increased Openness in Adoption Records Law, 45 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 101, 129 (1997).  
This law favors adoptees because it requires that the birth parents act affirmatively to 
retain their confidentiality. By requiring action to close rather than open the records, 
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only an adult may obtain his or her birth records, unlike children in 
paternity proceedings.81  
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING PRINCIPLES  
The Minor in Sutton had no standing to pursue his claim.82 As a 
child born to a married couple, Minor is a “legitimate” child with a 
legal mother and legal father.83 Statutes that allow children to pursue 
paternity suits were written for children born out of wedlock seeking 
paternal support.84 In contrast, Minor was born to married parents and 
already has a legal father, one he lived with full-time.85  
Even if Minor had standing to pursue a paternity action, based on 
the laws as they are written, Minor still should not have prevailed in 
his case against his mother, compelling her to disclose the identity of 
his biological father86—assuming that his mother even possesses this 
information. First, the legislative purpose of statutes allowing 
children to pursue paternity actions is to establish support obligations 
and to allow adult adoptees to view their birth records.87 Second, 
mothers like Diane have a right to privacy that cannot be infringed by 
 
Michigan’s law overcomes some of the problems of the standard mutual consent 
registry. This law allows the release of identifying information to most adoptees, as the 
majority of birth parents in Michigan have not denied the release of this information. 
However, . . . some adoptees are completely denied access to identifying information if 
the birth parents have filed a denial of release. 
Id.  
 81. See statutes cited supra notes 77, 80.  
 82. See Stolarz, supra note 54; Sutton ex rel. Minor J. v. Diane J., No. 273519, 2007 
Mich. App. LEXIS 754 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2007).  
 83. Sutton, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 754, at *4 (stating that “Minor J is deemed born in 
wedlock and legitimate under the Paternity Act”). Sutton acknowledged that “regardless of 
whether Minor J is deemed legitimate or illegitimate, legally he is accorded rights comparable 
to a legitimate child for purposes of support, and the distinction ultimately makes no difference 
with respect to our constitutional analysis.” Id. at *5.  
 84. Id.  
 85. See Pardo, supra note 3.  
 86. The Sutton court acknowledged the factors competing against Minor’s interest: 
“Diane’s privacy interests, John Doe’s interest in personal matters relative to his medical 
history and information, and the state’s interest in protecting family peace and unity, precluding 
disruption of lives before and after divorce, and keeping the court system unclogged.” Sutton, 
2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 754, at *9.  
 87. See infra Part V.A.  
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their children seeking the mother’s personal information.88 Mothers 
may have one or more legitimate reasons not to disclose the identity 
of their child’s biological father, or they simply may not have the 
information to disclose.89 Similarly, biological fathers, like Minor’s, 
have a right of privacy from unwanted intrusion by a child they 
possibly never knew about.90 Third, the harm to children caused by 
not knowing their biological father is not as grave as many 
commentators and courts suggest.91 Children who, like Minor, 
already have legal fathers92 have less of an interest in medical 
history,93 have a greater biological identity than other children 
seeking paternity determinations,94 and social pressure does not exist 
for these children the way it may for other children, like adoptees, 
seeking the identity of their biological parents.95 Last, if Minor had 
won his case the flood gates of litigation would be open to any child 
of a single parent seeking parental disclosure, regardless of the 
child’s motivation.96  
A. Legislative Purpose 
Legislative history reveals that there is no constitutional or 
statutory right for children to know the identity of both of their 
parents. The legislative purpose of paternity disclosure laws is for 
children of single parents to collect support from their absent parent, 
and adult adoptees to obtain their birth records.97 Therefore, when 
children like Minor are not seeking support, the legislative purpose 
behind support statutes does not assist their claim.  
 
 88. See infra Part V.B. 
 89. Id.  
 90. See infra Part V.C.  
 91. See infra Part V.D.  
 92. See infra Part V.D.1.  
 93. See infra Part V.D.2.  
 94. See infra Part V.D.3.  
 95. See infra Part V.D.4.  
 96. See infra Part V.E.  
 97. See Richards, supra note 53. If it were permissible for children to discover the identity 
of their biological parents, no matter their need for financial support, there would be no reason 
for states to limit adopted minors access to their birth records, which they do. Cf. statutes cited 
supra notes 77–80.  
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Moreover, though the desires for biological identity and medical 
history justify disclosure laws for adoptees, the same reasons are not 
as compelling for Minor or children like Minor seeking parentage 
determinations. With one biological parent, non-adopted children, 
unlike adult adoptees, can obtain half of their biological identity and 
genetic medical history from the parent they know (usually the birth 
mother). In addition, the parent they know may have knowledge 
about the other parent and be able to provide the child with enough 
non-identifying information about the absent parent that the child can 
form a full biological identity. The parent that the child knows may 
also have information about the absent parent’s health, genetic 
diseases, and other important non-identifying medical information. 
B. Mother’s Right to Privacy 
There is no constitutional right for children or adult adoptees to 
know the identity of their parents—the right was created by state 
legislative value judgments.98 The Constitution does, however, 
guarantee the right to privacy for everyone, children and parents 
alike.99 “Children have no legal right to force their parents to disclose 
family secrets—such as family histories and inherited traits. . . . 
[H]eritage . . . is not so intimately personal as to fall within the zones 
of privacy implicitly protected in the penumbra of the Bill of 
Rights.”100 A child’s state statutory right to know the identity of his 
or her parents does not trump the constitutional guarantee of a 
parent’s right to privacy, upheld numerous times by the Supreme 
Court.101 
In addition, the mother may have a legitimate reason not to 
disclose the identity of the child’s biological father.102 First, the 
 
 98. See supra Part V.A.; see also Richards, supra note 53, at 423–24. 
 99. See cases cited supra notes 26, 27.  
 100. Reiss, supra note 32, at 142 (citation omitted).  
 101. See cases cited supra notes 25, 27.  
 102. In such a case, a child is seeking to establish paternity either against his or her 
mother’s wishes or because his or her mother refuses to bring the paternity proceeding. Spada 
noted that a mother refusing to bring suit on behalf of her child may wish to avoid contact with 
the father, seek to avoid family or community disapproval, wish to support the child on her 
own, “be subject to emotional strain and confusion that often attends the birth of an illegitimate 
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mother may not know the identity of the child’s biological father 
because she engaged in sexual intercourse with multiple men near the 
time of the child’s conception, or because she does not remember 
who she had sexual intercourse with at the time of the child’s 
conception.103 Second, the child could have been conceived through 
anonymous donor insemination and the mother may not have access 
 
child,” or have a continuing affection for or relationship with the father. Spada v. Pauley, 385 
N.W.2d 746, 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).  
 In addition, the mother may decide not to initiate a paternity action because she does not 
know the identity of the father (may not know who impregnated her) or cannot obtain records 
of the father’s identity (may have been artificially inseminated at a fertility clinic that keeps the 
identity of sperm donors private). Stephen Sass explains that a mother’s multiple sexual 
partners at the probable time of her child’s conception can be a defense to a paternity suit. 
Stephen L. Sass, The Defense of Multiple Access (Exceptio Plurium Concubentium) in Paternity 
Suits: A Comparative Analysis, 51 TUL. L. REV. 468 (1977). “The defense is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘defense of multiple access,’ or exceptio plurium concubentium: ‘the plea (or 
defense) of several lovers.’” Id. at 468. Sass notes the disparity in the use of the defense in 
different countries:  
 The examination of the prevailing laws of paternity suits in West Germany, France, 
Hungary, the Soviet Union, and the United States has revealed that the mother’s 
multiple sexual connections during the probable period of conception are treated in 
three substantially different ways: 
 (1) They are an absolute bar to the adjudication of paternity in the majority of the 
United States’ jurisdictions and in certain instances in France (notorious misconduct 
(inconduit notaire) in a status action and debauchery in an action for child support). 
 (2) They are a relevant circumstance with diverse consequences: (a) in West 
Germany, and in the United States under the Uniform Parentage Act, the identified 
third person or persons may be brought into the proceedings and subjected to scientific 
examinations to ascertain nonpaternity or the probability of paternity; (b) in France an 
identified third person or persons can also be subjected to blood tests and other 
medical examinations to establish whether their paternity is excluded; if it is not 
excluded, the plaintiff cannot prevail in a status action; in an action for child support, 
however, all of the participants may be obligated to contribute to the child’s care and 
education if they have committed a tortious act against the mother in connection with 
the intercourse, or if they have promised to support the child; (c) in Hungary, where a 
status action is based on an extended, steady sexual relationship, a similar relationship 
between the mother and another man (provided that the paternity of the other is not 
excluded) or her promiscuous behavior exclude the application of section 38(2)(b) of 
the Family Code since such acts undermine its rationale: determination of a high 
probability of the defendant’s paternity; it can be established, if at all, only on the 
ground of section 38(2)(c), requiring the proof of a rather high probability. 
 (3) They are entirely irrelevant: in Hungary, in status actions based on lasting 
cohabitation and in support actions; and in the Soviet Union . . .  
Id. at 507.  
 103. See text accompanying supra note 102.  
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to sperm donor records. Third, the child could be a product of a 
rape—information that the mother wants to remain private.104 
Similarly, if the mother is a victim of domestic violence, she may fear 
abuse from her husband, from her child’s biological father, or from 
another abuser if she discloses the identity of her child’s biological 
father. Fourth, the child could be a product of an extramarital affair 
that the mother does not want to divulge.105  
Compelling a mother to disclose this information could fulfill her 
child’s genuine curiosity to learn where he or she came from, but a 
categorical rule imposing the obligation on all mothers would be 
unfair. There could be very good reasons why a mother wishes to 
keep her child’s biological father’s identity private, and her privacy 
should be protected.106  
C. Biological Father’s Right to Privacy 
Single mothers, as well as mothers who raise their children with a 
man not biologically related to their children, may choose not to 
inform the child’s biological father that he is the father of her child, 
or even that she was pregnant with his child. The oblivious biological 
father should not be punished later with paternal obligations for a 
child he never knew about,107 particularly when the child already has 
 
 104. Victims of rape should never be compelled by the state to disclose the identity of their 
rapist, or even the experience of their rape because those who choose to disclose that they were 
raped are not protected from public exposure. Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) 
(upholding a newspaper’s right to publish the name of a rape victim when the name was legally 
obtained from a police report). Furthermore, disclosure of rape can tear families apart. For 
example, rape victim Anna Creed wanted to keep her rape experience private, as well as the 
resulting pregnancy, and her relinquishment of the baby conceived by the rape to adoption. 48 
Hours: Part III-Family Secret; Unhappy Ending of Reunion with Birth Mother (CBS television 
broadcast Apr. 15, 1992). Creed and her family were emotionally destroyed when the child 
produced from the rape found his birth records and contacted the Creed family, uncovering the 
terrifying secret. Id.  
 105. Strom Thurmond fathered an African-American child in 1925, but because he was a 
powerful white man in the old South and later a U.S. Senator, the identity of Thurmond as the 
child’s father was not revealed by the child’s mother or by the child until after Thurmond’s 
death, 78 years later. Nikitta A. Foston, Strom Thurmond’s Black Family, EBONY, March, 2004, 
at 162.  
 106. See supra notes 102, 104–05.  
 107. See generally Meyer, supra note 48, at 771 (noting, “[a]n unwed father who had never 
been permitted contact with his child, for example, could not be guilty of abuse or neglect.”); 
Julie Rowe, So Who’s Your Daddy?, TIME, Jan. 29, 2007, at 50 (explaining the idea that “duped 
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a legal father who cares for him or her. Several years after the child’s 
conception, in Minor’s case seventeen years later, the biological 
father may not be willing to accept the child as his own and may not 
want contact with the child.108 Disclosure would not serve the child’s 
goal of developing a biological identity and possible relationship with 
his or her biological father.  
Furthermore, it could be difficult to locate or identify the child’s 
biological father. If a child like Minor were to win his suit and 
compel his mother to disclose the identity of his biological father, the 
child may have a difficult time finding his biological father. For 
example, his biological father could be in a different geographic 
location, could be living in conditions that do not allow him to have 
contact with the child (if incarcerated or institutionalized), or may 
have passed away.  
D. Not as Harmful as Suggested 
1. Existing Father 
Children like Minor already have two parents. In Sutton, Minor 
was seeking more than two parents; he sought the identity of a third, 
biological parent.109 If Minor had won his suit, the decision would 
have broken precedent with the majority of court decisions and 
deviated from the purpose of the majority of state laws—namely to 
establish support.110 Court holdings and state statutes allowing 
children to know their biological parents serve children with only one 
parent, not a child like Minor with a mother and legal father.111  
 
dads . . . should be treated as victims of fraud”).  
 108. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of 
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 69 (2004). Barber 
explains and supports the trend away from genetic determinations of parenthood towards 
contractual determinations of parenthood by reconciling “paternity precedent with technological 
advances, legal norms with parenting practices, and sexual mores with parental obligations.” Id. 
Parenthood according to contact, which includes the intent to become a parent, “makes every 
parent-child relationship a wanted parent-child relationship.” Id.  
 109. Though the law is changing, historically and traditionally, children are limited to two 
parents under the law.  
 110. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 111. See rules cited supra note 55.  
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Though Minor may seek some biological identity from his genetic 
father, Michael could serve all the other functions of Minor’s father 
by providing support, attention, parental connection, and love.  
2. Medical History 
Minor and other children of single parents do not have as great an 
interest in finding their missing biological medical history, and 
cannot use this justification for determining parentage, as might an 
adult adoptee.112 First, these children already know fifty percent of 
their family medical history from their mother’s side of the family (or 
father’s side, if the father is the known parent).  
Second, the parent raising the child may know something about 
the medical history and health of the other biological parent.113 The 
parent raising the child can provide that non-identifying information 
to the child upon the child’s request. Even though this information 
may not provide a child with his full medical history, it may be 
enough to determine his medical susceptibilities. In cases where a 
single parent cannot provide the child with the other parent’s medical 
history, the parent can take extra precaution with the child’s medical 
care, knowing that there are gaps in the child’s family medical history 
that could cause medical problems later in life. Moreover, there are 
children who already know both of their biological parents, but do 
not know their biological propensities; and there are parents who do 
not know their own biological medical histories. Even if Minor won 
his suit and obtained his biological father’s identity, there is no 
assurance that his biological father would know about his own 
medical propensities.  
 
 112. The Sutton court explained that, “[t]here is no indication whatsoever that Minor is in 
the midst of a health crisis necessitating the sought after information, nor that he is 
contemplating having children at this time.” Sutton ex rel. Minor J. v. Diane J., No. 273519, 
2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 754, *10 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2007).  
 113. Even if the child was conceived using alternative reproductive technologies, such as 
donor insemination, the clinic providing donor eggs or sperm may have provided the known 
parent non-identifying information about the unknown donor parent.  
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3. Biological Identity 
Children of single parents or children like Minor raised by one 
biological and one non-biological parent still have fifty percent of 
their biological identity from their known parent and that parent’s 
family. Unlike adopted children seeking biological identity, these 
children have some sense of their genetic origin. Furthermore, one’s 
identity does not just stem from his or her biological connections.114 
Identity comes from relationships, experiences, personality, values, 
knowledge, and many other sources.115 Though biological identity 
may be a piece of a person’s total self, it does not completely define 
one’s identity.116 Minor may only know half of his biological identity, 
but he can easily know himself and his character without knowing his 
biological father. For example, Minor can associate his nature with 
his legal father, mother, friends, family, and other individuals present 
in his life.  
4. Social Pressure  
Social pressure to find biological paternity faced by children like 
Minor is minimal or non-existent. Minor and children like him 
already live in the traditional two-parent family accepted by 
society.117 Although under the surface there may not be the same 
biological connection between the child and one of the parents, they 
live a “normal,” traditional family life. Adopted children on the other 
hand, who know they are adopted, are likely to feel societal pressure 
much more than children like Minor.118 There are enough single-
parent families in society that a child like Minor should not feel 
social pressure to know both of his biological parents.  
 
 114. See generally Carol J. Guardo & Janis Beebe Bohan, Development of a Sense of Self-
Identity in Children, 42 CHILD DEV. 1909 (1971).  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. See Meyer, supra note 48.  
 118. Id. at 810.  
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E. Flood Gates of Litigation 
If Minor had won his appeal against his mother, and she was 
compelled to disclose the identity of Minor’s biological father, any 
child or adult would be permitted to sue one parent to disclose the 
identity of an absent parent. This would include any child raised by a 
single parent—either mother or father—when the child never knew 
his or her other biological parent. This would also include children 
conceived through anonymous donor insemination, violating the 
donor’s right to privacy as well as the privacy of the known parent.119 
Though Minor has some genuine reasons for seeking the identity of 
his biological father, it was proper to preclude him from doing so.  
VI. AN APPROACH FOR COURTS  
Although the Michigan courts rightly decided Minor’s case in 
favor of his mother based on current law, there are conceivably 
different circumstances where a child’s attempt to discover the 
identity of his biological parent is more compelling. It is conceivable 
that a child must know something about his or her absent biological 
parent, if the child suffers from an imminent life threatening medical 
disorder that must be treated early in the child’s life for the child to 
survive. Accordingly, courts should apply a narrow form of the 
child’s best interests test that takes into account the constitutional 
right of parental privacy, and awards parental disclosure only in 
limited situations.120 This test would require courts to weigh factors 
such as “stability of the child's current home environment, whether 
there is an ongoing family unit, . . . the child's physical, mental, and 
emotional needs[,] . . . the child's past relationship with [his or her] 
putative father[,] . . . [and] the child's ability to ascertain genetic 
information for the purpose of medical treatment and genealogical 
history,” against the parent’s privacy interest.121  
 
 119. See cases cited supra notes 25, 27.  
 120. The child’s best interest test predominates state laws governing child and parent 
relationships. Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth 
for the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 77 (2006) (discussing the 
prominence of the child’s best-interest test in state laws).  
 121. Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. 1992) (identifying factors to weigh in 
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If a court determined that a child’s best interests were served by 
acquiring information about his or her absent biological parent, the 
court could award the child non-identifying information about the 
parent. An award of non-identifying information would protect the 
privacy of both biological parents, yet provide the child with 
necessary medical or psychological information about the absent 
biological parent. Practically implementing this judgment would 
require the biological parent raising the child to disclose the non-
 
disputed paternity cases). Michigan law delineates similar factors for a child’s best interest 
custody disputes.  
As used in this [A]ct, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of the following 
factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court: 
 (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties 
involved and the child. 
 (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, 
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or 
her religion or creed, if any. 
 (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with 
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the 
laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs. 
 (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and 
the desirability 
of maintaining continuity. 
 (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or 
homes. 
 (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. 
 (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.  
 (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 
 (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of 
sufficient age to express preference. 
 (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a 
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent 
or the child and  
the parents. 
 (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or 
witnessed by the child. 
 (l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child 
custody dispute. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23 (1971). Under these factors, a court could easily determine that 
Minor’s best interests are served by not learning the identity of his biological father.  
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identifying information to the child or disclose the information to an 
intermediary122 who may disclose non-identifying information to the 
child. If a mother does not know the identity of the biological father 
(presumably a present biological father would more easily know the 
identity of an absent biological mother), a court could appoint an 
intermediary to investigate and determine the biological father’s 
identity, then disclose non-identifying information about the father to 
the child.123 An investigation by an intermediary could be expensive 
and should be ordered in very limited circumstances.  
The balancing test suggested will help courts with these cases, but 
to adequately address all of the competing interests at stake, 
legislative reform must be implemented. Most laws lag as science 
redefines the concept of family. Laws must be updated, taking into 
account accurate DNA paternity testing, alternative reproductive 
technologies, and other scientific advances, while respecting a 
mother’s and putative biological father’s constitutional right to 
privacy. Though science can provide clear answers to questions of 
biological relations, science also has the potential to rip apart families 
and destroy family autonomy. Courts and legislatures are faced with 
tough challenges, and must tread carefully to address all the interests 
at stake.  
CONCLUSION 
Though this Note advocates parental privacy over a child’s desire 
to know his or her biological parents, it explains that a categorical 
rule should not be applied in all cases, where different factors could 
justify a different outcome. Any rule adopted by courts or legislatures 
on this matter must account for changing families and alternative 
forms of conception, while maintaining a proper balance between 
children’s desire to know their biological parents, and parents’ right 
to privacy.124  
 
 122. Some states use intermediaries to facilitate communication and contact between an 
adoptee and his or her parent(s) when both parties agree to disclosure of their identities. See 
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-25-8 (West 1999) (use of an intermediary in adoption questions).  
 123. Even then, there is no guarantee that the biological father will be aware of his own 
medical propensities.  
 124. Rules and laws affecting the family must be flexible, as different factors, 
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If Minor had won his case against his mother, dangerous 
precedent would have been set in Michigan for children to sue their 
parents. In addition, courts from around the country could have used 
that decision to undermine parental privacy throughout the United 
States. The Michigan courts hearing Minor’s case rightly proceeded 
with caution. One can only assume that the courts had in mind the 
ramifications of a decision in favor of Minor. This case had the 
potential to remove parental privacy from constitutional protection. 
 
relationships, consequences, and outcomes could lead to tragic or inadequate results in any 
given case. 
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